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Abstract 
Drawing on interviews with 77 high-performing eBay business sellers in France and 
Belgium, this article investigates the power asymmetries generated by customers’ evaluations 
in online work settings. Sellers revealed a high degree of sensitivity to negative reviews, 
which, while infrequent, triggered feelings of anxiety and vulnerability. Their accounts 
exposed power asymmetries at two levels: the transactional level between sellers and 
customers and the governance level between sellers and eBay. Our findings highlight three 
main mechanisms underlying power asymmetries in this context. First, online customer 
evaluations have created a new form of employee monitoring in which power is exercised 
through the construction of visibility gaps between buyers and sellers and through an implicit 
coalition between buyers and the platform owner, who join together in the evaluation 
procedures. Second, by mediating and objectifying relations, algorithms reproduce power 
asymmetries among the different categories of actors, thereby constraining human agency. 
Third, online customer evaluations prompt sellers to exploit their practical knowledge of the 
algorithm to increase their agency. Through the lived experience of working for an algorithm, 
our findings contribute new understandings of power and agency in online work settings. 
 
Keywords: power asymmetries, algorithms, online evaluations, sociomateriality, agency, 
practice 
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Contemporary work settings increasingly rely on customer reviews—peer-generated 
evaluations of products’ and sellers’ quality on third-party platforms (Mudambi and Schuff, 
2010). Typically associated with online platforms such as eBay, Amazon, Uber, Airbnb, and 
Yelp, these work settings portray new configurations of power that can be characterized by a 
number of features. First, in place of traditional dyadic exchanges, customer reviews enact 
triadic relationships among the platform operator, buyers, and sellers that generate multiple 
accountabilities. Second, these relationships are mediated by algorithmic evaluation 
apparatuses that assess performance according to both set metrics (Orlikowski and Scott, 
2014) and written feedback (Pavlou and Dimoka, 2006). Third, anonymous customers form 
part of an invisible “crowd” that impinges on each individual seller’s profile and reputation 
through public online evaluations (Orlikowski and Scott, 2015). 
The link between online customer reviews and power is vividly captured in a 
comment made to us by a seller of videogames working on eBay: 
We eventually realized that there was still a sort of Sword of Damocles hanging over 
the big sellers. We’re in a sort of system where we’re not very free. They [eBay] 
impose things on us—conditions, customer satisfaction and all that—which become 
totally excessive. Today, it’s impossible to be 100% positive, because there’s always 
a client who’ll say “terrible service, don’t buy here.” So, it’s difficult to work our 
way forward, because our hands are tied. 
Online reviews produce a power asymmetry because the parties involved have a differential 
ability to take action. In the quote, the asymmetry stems from sellers being simultaneously 
accountable to the platform owner, who has the power to impose conditions, and to buyers, 
who have the power to post negative reviews and comments online. The metaphor of the 
“Sword of Damocles” expresses the imminent risk of sanctions resulting from the 
impossibility of fulfilling the ideal norm of 100 percent positive reviews. As a consequence, 
sellers see themselves as part of an obscure mechanism of algorithm-generated metrics (“a 
sort of system”) that diminishes their agency. 
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Evaluation practices have been linked to the exercise of power in conventional work 
environments, where power asymmetries are enacted by means of hierarchical observation 
between a manager and an employee (Foucault, 1977; Townley, 1993; Patriotta and Brown, 
2011). Employees in these environments exercise agency through compliance, collective 
action, or individual resistance (Crozier and Friedberg, 1980; Vallas, 2006; Elmer, 2012). 
Current theories, however, do not adequately explain power asymmetries or individual 
agency in online work settings because in these settings, the traditional distinction between 
managers and employees is blurred, and managerial observation is replaced by algorithmic 
forms of monitoring. Accordingly, the assumptions made in relation to hierarchical power 
and subordinates’ exercise of agency do not hold in increasingly virtual environments. The 
purpose of this article is to reframe the conversation around power asymmetry in 
organizational studies by taking into account this new world of work. We ask what the 
experience of being evaluated reveals about asymmetries of power in online work settings 
and how individuals who are subjected to online evaluations deal with algorithm-mediated 
forms of power. 
To investigate these questions, we studied a group of business sellers on the eBay 
platform. This is a representative setting in which sellers are evaluated by their buyers within 
a higher-level algorithmic system of sanctions and rewards designed and enforced by the 
platform owner. We selected a sample of large-volume, high-performing sellers—all of 
whom had positive ratings above 95 percent—expecting them to report positive experiences 
of online selling. Instead, we found that online evaluations generated uncertainty and a sense 
of vulnerability, in response to which they developed practices for reclaiming agency. Our 
findings suggest new theoretical understandings of the power asymmetries underlying 
algorithmic evaluation apparatuses and how they influence individual agency. 
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Power Asymmetries and Evaluations in the Workplace 
Power has traditionally been conceived as an asymmetrical relationship (Dahl, 1957) that 
rests on the “net ability of a person to withhold rewards from and apply sanctions to others” 
(Blau, 1964: 117) and implies that one side has the capacity to overtly or covertly control the 
desires of others (Lukes, 1974). Workplace designs influence power asymmetries between 
individuals by providing norms, roles, spatial layouts, procedures, and disciplinary 
mechanisms that define how power is distributed and affect individuals’ capacity to exert 
their agency (Pfeffer, 1981; Clegg, 1989; Sewell, 1992). Workplace settings thus constitute 
relatively stable configurations of asymmetrical relations that are produced and reproduced 
through ongoing interactions (Danzger, 1964; Barley, 1990; Brass and Burkhardt, 1993). 
Power asymmetries are maintained over time by means of evaluation mechanisms that 
regulate individuals’ behaviors and ensure their compliance with predefined standards. In 
conventional work settings, evaluations presuppose hierarchical relations: they occur in 
contexts of ongoing monitoring punctuated by moments of formal appraisal in which 
managers and employees are generally physically present (Murphy and Cleveland, 1995; 
Levy and Williams, 2004). Evaluations impose discipline by setting expectations about 
individuals’ conduct and establishing procedures for assessing conformity. Through 
performance appraisals, managers bestow rewards and punishments based on conformity to 
set norms that define the attainment (or non-attainment) of organizational objectives 
(Townley, 1993; Vallas, 2006). Control over the evaluation system therefore constitutes a 
major source of power. 
The archetype of monitoring and evaluation of workforces can be found in Bentham’s 
panopticon, which Foucault used as a model for his conceptualization of hierarchical 
observation and normalizing judgment. Foucault (2002: 70) defined panoptic power as “a 
type of power that is applied to individuals in the form of continuous individual supervision, 
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in the form of control, punishment, and compensation, and in the form of correction, that is, 
the molding and transformation of individuals in terms of certain norms.” From this 
perspective, hierarchical relationships between supervisees and supervisors are enacted 
through building design, which gives supervisors the power of invisibility—seeing without 
being seen—and transforms those being supervised into isolated and perfectly visible 
subjects. The architecture of the panopticon, which was initially conceived for prisons, leads 
to automatic subservience “as instilled in prisoners who architecturally speaking must assume 
. . . that they may be under inspection at any time, night or day” (Elmer, 2012: 23). Because 
they never know when they are being watched, they behave according to the norm. Hence the 
panopticon model highlights how individuals who are subjected to ongoing scrutiny in their 
daily routines may internalize behavioral norms and evaluation criteria (Sewell and Barker, 
2006). 
When norms and physical arrangements are clearly defined, those subordinated to 
them know what to expect when they deviate. The impersonality of the norm, which is a 
feature of bureaucracies (Weber, 1978), facilitates the unambiguous assessment of what is 
right or wrong (Wiltermuth and Flynn, 2013), thereby rendering the distribution of rewards 
and sanctions understandable and acceptable (Molm, 1990, 1997). Furthermore, sanctions 
tend to be more effective when they relate to an exhaustive set of norms and expectations, 
when the link between deviation from these norms and the sanction is transparent, and when 
there is an automatic application of sanctions if deviation occurs (Foucault, 1977; Wiltermuth 
and Flynn, 2013). Transparency should lead to discipline, which includes subordinates’ 
acceptance of a higher-order authority without the use of coercive methods (Pfeffer, 1981). 
Paradoxically, subordinates’ knowledge of rules and sanctions enables deviation from 
the norm, thus creating scope for individual agency. Subordinates express agency under 
conditions of power asymmetry by leveraging specific skills to bend the established norms to 
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their advantage (Mechanic, 1962; Vallas, 2006), by exploiting zones of uncertainty to control 
actors with greater power (Crozier and Friedberg, 1980), or by expressing opposition through 
cynicism and storytelling (Prasad and Prasad, 2000; Fleming and Spicer, 2003). Subordinates 
can also express agency through collective resistance in the form of strike actions or the 
informal expression of dissent, which is more likely to take place where there is a union 
presence (Rubin, 1986; Roscigno and Hodson, 2004; Korczynski, 2014). Thus stable norms 
imply agency because knowledgeable actors are able to exert some degree of control over the 
network of asymmetrical relationships in which they are embroiled (Sewell, 1992). 
Online work environments constitute new arenas in which customers’ evaluations 
replace traditional forms of performance appraisal (Beuscart, Mellet, and Trespeuch, 2016). 
In these contexts, power asymmetries cannot be adequately described using the framework of 
hierarchical observation and physical monitoring of subjects. With online customer 
evaluations, there are no designated employers or employees, actors are not physically 
collocated, and ongoing assessments are not punctuated by moments of formal appraisals as 
in traditional settings. Rather, online evaluations open up the interaction space, increase the 
physical distance between social actors interacting in this space, and often involve dealing 
with algorithms and pseudonyms rather than physical persons. 
Online customer evaluations have important implications for the production and 
reproduction of power asymmetries. Compared with traditional forms of evaluation, which 
are characterized by dyadic relationships between a supervisor and a subordinate, online 
customer evaluations generate two levels of accountability that are connected through 
algorithmic intermediation. At a transactional level, sellers are made accountable to a 
diversity of buyers, who evaluate according to their personal experience. At a governance 
level, sellers are made accountable to the platform owner, who designs and implements the 
system of rewards and sanctions. For example, the online platform TripAdvisor imposes 
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multiple accountabilities on hotel owners. At a transactional level, “the subjectivity 
embedded in traveler reviews . . . suggests that multiple evaluation principles are in play” 
(Scott and Orlikowski, 2012: 36). At a governance level, TripAdvisor applies a ranking 
algorithm, or “Popularity Index,” which serves as a basis for distributing rewards to hoteliers 
(Scott and Orlikowski, 2012; Orlikowski and Scott, 2014). Individuals who are subjected to 
this multilevel and potentially contradictory feedback may experience ambiguity with regard 
to behavioral norms and performance indicators. In online settings, this ambiguity is 
potentially reinforced by the anonymity of those who post evaluations and by the high 
frequency of reviews, which are generally posted “on an almost real-time basis” (Orlikowski 
and Scott, 2014: 885). The social system underpinning online reviews lacks the stability of 
employer–employee relationships, with important implications for power. 
Online customer evaluations also depend on agency being delegated to algorithmic 
apparatuses that act on behalf of the platform owner. The crowd of customers generates 
experience-based evaluations that are compiled by the algorithm and used by the platform 
owner to regulate transactions. Studies on sociomateriality have shown how algorithms are 
increasingly shaping social relationships at work (Orlikowski and Scott, 2008, 2015). From 
this perspective, algorithms are “non-human actants” (Latour, 1990) endowed with the ability 
to evaluate, rank, and reward or punish individuals based on pre-programmed instructions. 
They not only have the materiality of a calculative object, but they also make participants act 
and react (Lenglet, 2011; MacKenzie, 2019). As calculative objects, algorithms operate in 
subtle ways: they are “virtuals” that generate a whole variety of “actuals”; they are 
compressed and hidden, and we do not encounter them in the way that we encounter 
traditional rules (Lash, 2007; Beer, 2009, 2017). The increasing reliance on algorithms as 
instruments for the regulation of social relationships, coupled with the invisibility of 
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algorithmic evaluation apparatuses, is evidence of subtle new ways of exercising power in the 
workplace. 
The emergence of online customer evaluations as a pervasive aspect of work has 
produced a new context for power in which asymmetries are distributed and elusive, and this 
configuration of asymmetries has implications for the exercise of individual agency. In online 
settings, individuals’ capacity to circumvent power asymmetries might be affected by the 
anonymity of customer reviews, the concealment of the platform owner behind the algorithm, 
and the algorithm itself, which reduces spaces of uncertainty through the ongoing monitoring 
of interactions on the platform. Current theories of power, because they rely on assumptions 
of dyadic relationships and hierarchical monitoring, do not hold in this new context. Hence 
there is a need to develop a fresh understanding of power that accounts for the significant 
transformations taking place in contemporary work settings. In this paper we investigate the 
connection between algorithmic-mediated forms of power and individual agency by looking 
at how sellers on eBay deal with power asymmetries in the context of online evaluations. 
 
Research Context and Methodology 
Online Customer Evaluations on eBay 
Our empirical setting is the eBay marketplace in France and Belgium, where two of the 
authors used to live. On eBay, private and business sellers can advertise and sell goods in 
exchange for a set fee (the “insertion fee”) and, if the sale takes place, a percentage of the sale 
price.1 Buyers do not pay a fee. The reliability and quality of sellers are monitored through 
online evaluations whereby customers who have concluded a transaction are invited to 
                                                 
1 The structure and calculation of fees have changed over time. For example, in France, 
insertion fees for business sellers have been successively withdrawn and reestablished. 
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provide a rating between one (the lowest) and five (the highest) based on four predefined 
criteria: “how accurate was the item description?”; “how satisfied were you with the seller’s 
communication?”; “how quickly did the seller dispatch the item?”; and “how reasonable were 
the postage and packaging charges?” Customers are also invited to leave an overall rating and 
comments. 
These ratings, which are compiled through an algorithm, have a direct impact on 
sellers for two reasons. First, they are public. A seller with very high ratings will attract more 
buyers than a seller with low ratings. A feedback score is calculated for every seller based on 
the number of positive, negative, and neutral ratings the seller has received over time. A 
positive rating adds one point to the feedback score, and a negative rating subtracts one point. 
This score is made visible to everyone on the seller’s profile. Next to the score, a positive 
feedback rating indicates the percentage of positive ratings left by buyers in the previous 12 
months. Along with the feedback score and rating, the feedback profile page shows recent 
feedback ratings and comments, any bid retractions, and detailed ratings of sellers. 
Second, eBay uses these ratings to manage sellers. Regular sellers with high volumes 
of sales are granted “PowerSeller” status if they sustain positive ratings above 98 percent 
over the prior 12 months. This status is associated with privileges such as accounting tools, a 
dedicated helpline, and a special “PowerSeller” badge next to their listings. eBay also uses 
ratings to rank sellers in search results. The order of sellers is determined by the algorithm, 
and detailed ratings are compiled in it. Additionally, eBay calculates a seller level every 
month (above or below standard) based on a series of requirements, such as a maximum 
percentage of transactions with defects or a maximum percentage of transactions dispatched 
late. Sellers whose detailed ratings are persistently below standard are suspended from selling 
for a certain period of time. 
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Research Procedure and Data Sources 
The initial motivation for this research was an interest in how online sellers, whose 
relationships with buyers are mediated by an electronic market platform, experienced their 
work and adapted their practices to the platform’s characteristics. While online customer 
evaluations were not an initial focus for the data collection, sellers’ reference to them was so 
pervasive in our interviews that we came to regard them as an essential element of 
individuals’ experience of work in this setting. We followed a grounded theory methodology 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton, 2013). Our informants conveyed 
their interpretation of the evaluation system and made many comments about control and 
autonomy. Based on sellers’ accounts related to being evaluated, we identified patterns in the 
data and inductively developed theoretical insights about the power and agency dynamics 
underlying online customer evaluations. 
Sampling. We selected our interviewees from among the eBay business sellers with 
the largest number of transactions, signaling high sales activity. This purposeful sampling 
was appropriate for two reasons. First, it avoided inexperienced sellers, whose judgment 
could be biased negatively because of not understanding the platform’s features or biased 
positively because of the excitement of starting a business and making a new living from the 
platform. Second, and relatedly, we expected that informants’ extensive experience of the 
platform would enable them to be reflective and to offer more-nuanced views of online work. 
Our sample consisted of sellers who had received more than 1,000 evaluations at the time 
they were interviewed. Information on sellers was readily available on the eBay platform, 
including their numbers of sales, categories of products, and average evaluation scores. The 
sample was relatively homogeneous in terms of evaluation scores: all had at least 95 percent 
positive evaluations, and the vast majority (94 percent of our sample) were above 98 percent. 
High scores and high sales activity are generally related: the sellers who sell the most are also 
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those with good evaluation scores. Our sample thus comprised highly active, experienced 
business sellers with excellent ratings. 
We selected business sellers to represent all product categories as listed on eBay 
websites (see table 1) to avoid ending up with too many sellers dealing in the same type of 
products and potentially developing similar arguments. We contacted these sellers by phone 
or e-mail using the details provided on their eBay webpage or in their terms of sale. The 
method was approved by eBay’s headquarters in France and Belgium, whom we contacted 
before we collected the data. 
The sampling design remained the same throughout the process, even when we started 
to home in on the importance of evaluations. We were confident that our focus on 
experienced sellers was theoretically appropriate because these were the sellers with the most 
extensive involvement in the evaluation process, and thus they were most likely to have 
developed their own coping practices. This was central to our theoretical concerns. As every 
seller on eBay was in a similar situation, we were able to build a theory of power asymmetry 
by retaining our original sampling method. This is consistent with the argument that 
“theoretical sampling . . . is a variation within purposeful sampling” (Coyne, 1997: 629). 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
Interviews. We carried out 77 interviews with business sellers: 51 interviews were 
conducted face to face and the remaining 26 by telephone at the interviewees’ convenience. 
All the interviews were conducted in French by the first and fourth authors. Interviews lasted 
between 20 and 110 minutes (the average duration was 56 minutes), which amounted to 72 
hours of interviews in total. We stopped gathering data when no new information emerged 
from the interviews. This phenomenon of theoretical saturation, which occurs when “no 
additional data are being found whereby the [researcher] can develop properties of the 
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category” (Glaser and Strauss, 2008: 61), was visible in the decreasing number of new first-
order categories emerging from each additional interview. 
We followed a semi-structured interview protocol (see the Online Appendix at 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx) that focused on our 
informants’ experience as business sellers on eBay. We asked questions about their normal 
working days, the specificities of the eBay marketplace for transactions, their perceptions of 
eBay as the marketplace owner, and their views on buyers’ behavior. We also asked them to 
elaborate on the good and bad aspects of doing business on eBay, how they adapted their 
activity to eBay’s requirements, and their projects for the future. The interview guide was 
adapted at an early stage with changes made to the wording and a few new questions added 
on the future and their interactions with other sellers. 
After 15 or so interviews we realized that references to online evaluations were 
recurrent, but we chose not to reorient the interview guide with a new set of specific 
questions on evaluations for two reasons. First, we were concerned that this might lead to 
forced, biased, or unnatural answers from our informants. Second, we were confident that the 
existing guide was already leading to rich data on experiences of online evaluation, with 
nearly all of the respondents introducing the topic spontaneously. Instead, we adapted to our 
informants’ flow of arguments by prompting, probing, and clarifying the issue of evaluations 
and respondents’ ways of coping with them. This approach allowed us to obtain rich accounts 
of sellers’ work on eBay and, based on this evidence, to develop new theoretical 
understandings. All our interviews were recorded and transcribed in full. 
Data Analysis 
Data analysis followed three steps. We started with first-order open coding (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998; Glaser and Strauss, 2008) of all interviews with the business sellers. Our main 
purpose was to immerse ourselves in the interviews by coding each of them extensively. At 
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first, we did not have a clear idea of what data would prove to be most salient. The first-order 
coding was shared between the two authors who conducted the interviews. We ensured 
reliability and consistency of the coding through the use of several techniques. First, the two 
authors worked on calibrating the units of meaning (fragments of sentences, sentences, or 
paragraphs) by coding the four initial interviews together. Second, two interviews were 
double coded at three points in the coding process to ensure reliability between the raters. We 
used the NVivo matching tool to assess the percentage of codes that were in agreement. The 
score was always at least .97, which indicates that the ratings were reliable. Last, consistency 
was ensured via bimonthly checks for new codes. Each rater carefully reviewed the new 
codes or code changes proposed by the other for as long as the coding process continued. In 
the case of disagreements or misunderstandings, adjustments were discussed. 
During the second stage, we cycled between further data analysis and consultation 
with the relevant literature. At this stage, we had established informants’ recurring reference 
to customer reviews. Sellers conveyed their frustration with the practice of being 
continuously evaluated and made systematic references to asymmetries in their relationships 
with buyers and eBay. We therefore turned to the literature on power as a guide for theme 
development. The first three authors worked on collating the first-order categories into 
second-order themes and, at a later stage, aggregate dimensions (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; 
Charmaz, 2014). Our objective was to organize the data around broader conceptual topics to 
identify regularities and develop links between the richness of the case and the theoretical 
objectives. Moving from raw data to a higher level of abstraction was not a linear process and 
required several iterations. Intermediate-level coding provided the second-order themes, 
which “reassemble[d] the data [we had] fractured during initial coding, to give coherence to 
the emerging analysis” (Charmaz, 2014: 147). 
15 
 
 
The final stage was assembling the second-order themes into aggregate dimensions, 
which enabled us to inductively develop a conceptual framework that linked the concepts 
emerging from the data (Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton, 2013). It took several attempts before 
we found the final structure that is presented here. To theorize further from the aggregate 
dimensions, we identified relations among dimensions and considered the final coding 
structure in light of existing theories of power, sociomateriality, and agency. This process 
enabled us to develop “theory for the substantive area” of our research (Glaser and Strauss, 
2008: 114), platform monitoring and online evaluation. To illustrate, statements that revealed 
sellers’ experience of online feedback from their clients were gathered in eight first-order 
categories, such as “Buyers blackmail through evaluations” and “We receive negative 
evaluations without being given the opportunity to solve the problem.” These first-order 
categories were grouped into three second-order themes, which were then ordered in one 
aggregate dimension relating to sellers’ experience of power asymmetry vis-à-vis buyers 
(“Power asymmetries at the transactional level”). This dimension was compared with other 
dimensions (e.g., “Power asymmetries at the governance level”) and exposed to conventional 
theories of power to identify two mechanisms constitutive of “platform monitoring,” which 
we present in the discussion section. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 shows the data structure. The emergent conceptual model comprises three 
core elements. First, sellers conveyed their feeling of being subjected to the power of 
anonymous and invisible customers; second, they expressed their frustration at being 
subjected to the power of a distant and indifferent platform owner; and third, they attempted 
to reclaim agency through collective practices targeting eBay and individual practices aimed 
at reestablishing symmetry in their relationship with buyers. Below, we elaborate on each of 
these elements to develop our theoretical narrative. 
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Online Evaluations and Power Asymmetries 
Negative evaluations were rare among business sellers: in our sample, only 5 percent of 
transactions received negative feedback, while 72 out of 77 of our respondents received over 
98 percent positive feedback. It surprised us that sellers with this kind of profile, most of 
whom worked from home and had discretion over the way they organized their days, 
expressed so much frustration about eBay’s online evaluation system. In the next sections, we 
detail sellers’ experience of evaluations on eBay, referring to their accountability to the 
buyers (at the “transactional level”) and to the platform owner (at the “governance level”). 
Power Asymmetries at the Transactional Level 
On eBay, buyers had a unilateral capacity to evaluate sellers. The lack of reciprocity in 
evaluations generated power asymmetry at a transactional level, which featured pervasively 
in our interviews with sellers. The asymmetry was manifest as a gap of visibility: buyers 
remained largely invisible to sellers, while sellers felt entirely visible to buyers. Sellers 
complained that they were “unable to have an accurate view of buyers,” that they were 
deprived of a “proper thermometer for buyers,” and that “nobody knows if a buyer is a bad 
buyer.” A seller explained the implications of being exposed in this way: “The main problem 
I have is with the level of visibility of these evaluations. Your reputation can be ruined 
overnight by somebody you don’t even know.” Here’s how a bookseller illustrated the power 
of hidden buyers: 
The main problem we have is that people hide behind their computer screens and 
find a lot of excitement in throwing up roadblocks. These people seem to take some 
malicious delight in shooting you down. They don’t realize how difficult it is for us 
to run a business. (C3)2 
                                                 
2 The quote identifiers in parentheses indicate the seller’s category as shown in table 1 and a 
unique number assigned to that interviewee within the category. 
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Sellers described their relationships with buyers as “impersonal,” “cold,” and “made 
of boring exchanges.” They explained that they could not know “who was behind an 
account” and that customers were “just pseudonyms.” They could only envisage them 
performing a series of mandatory actions, as illustrated by a furniture seller: 
I don’t know my eBay clients. Not at all. I picture them, but the picture may be 
biased. They’re anonymous. Sometimes, there’s no communication at all: they buy, 
pay for their purchases via the payment system, and receive automatic updates about 
their order. I ship to the address provided, and that’s it, there is no follow-up. For 
human interactions, I have my shop. (M3) 
Some sellers complained that eBay made it impossible to communicate with buyers directly. 
The system hid buyers’ e-mail addresses, and even potential buyers’ pseudonyms, during the 
auction process. These tools buffered buyer–seller relationships and reinforced the visibility 
gap between the parties, as a seller of collectible medals explained: 
There’s a big disadvantage with eBay, and I think it’s done on purpose; it’s that we 
don’t know, we don’t have the details of our clients. We can’t contact them directly. 
We don’t have their e-mail address, automatically. That’s annoying, because you 
need to contact them via eBay, always. We have to ask them their e-mail address via 
eBay if we need to. It’s done to control the transactions, to prevent us from dealing 
directly with buyers, I think. (H4) 
Within an environment characterized by invisibility and anonymity, sellers reported 
different hostile practices that buyers deployed. For example, they complained that most 
negative evaluations they received were unfair and based on criteria that fell outside their 
remit, such as speed, cost of shipping, or undelivered items. Buyers made no attempt to 
understand the origin of problems and tended to systematically lay the blame on sellers. One 
seller complained that his “reputation and sales [could] drop just because the postman forgot 
to leave a calling card in the buyer’s mailbox.” A seller of comic books testified to the “lack 
of understanding” on the part of buyers: 
If a buyer is unhappy because the item hasn’t arrived yet, it’s not my fault. The buyer 
could have chosen a faster shipping option. But when things like this happen, you 
wouldn’t believe how buyers shoot you down. There’s a total lack of understanding 
on their side. (D1) 
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Another hostile practice was the use of online evaluation as a form of blackmail. 
Negative reviews were at times used as weapons for obtaining favors. Some sellers talked 
about buyers who negotiated the price of an item after winning an auction and who 
threatened retaliation with a negative evaluation if they did not comply. They also recalled 
situations when they did not react after a buyer failed to pay for a purchase because they 
feared a negative evaluation. One seller evoked a “system of pressure from the buyer towards 
the seller,” which a seller of jewelry explained this way: 
There are people who blackmail me, who negotiate everything. And I receive 
negative feedback because I refuse, but what can I do? I can’t just accept any 
request. No later than this morning, I received a message. I sold an item by auction, 
19.90 euros, and the woman wants it for 9.90 euros. Or somebody who is not happy 
with his purchase, so I asked him to return the item to get a refund, but he doesn’t 
want to pay the postage. They all threatened to post negative evaluations. (O4) 
Buyers’ hostile practices could also take the form of aggressive reactions. Buyers 
would sometimes “complain when their item hasn’t arrived the day after they’ve ordered it,” 
be “upset if reminded to send the payment on time,” and “send insulting e-mails” for trifling 
matters. Sellers described buyers as “totally free to do what they want” and eBay as “a 
system of aggression.” A seller of collectible toys described the “strong-arm” nature of 
relationships with eBay buyers: 
The word that comes to my mind when I think of the eBay marketplace is 
“aggressive.” People use strong-arm methods to make themselves heard. Most of the 
time, it’s because they’re not used to online shopping and are afraid to be ripped off. 
Some people don’t hesitate to send us messages with things like “you’re a crook, 
you’re a thief.” Some people have a strong tendency to insult. (U2) 
Sellers’ perceptions that buyers were hostile made them feel vulnerable. Because 
buyers often opted for anonymous retaliation rather than constructive discussion, sellers felt 
deprived of the opportunity to solve problems. Based on their previous sales experience, they 
believed that meaningful communication could alleviate most issues. Instead, buyers’ lack of 
communication led to negative feelings: sellers recounted the “traumatizing” experience, the 
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“sickening feeling” associated with the experience of being deprived of the benefit of the 
doubt and denied the opportunity to demonstrate their professionalism, as mentioned by this 
seller of garden furniture: 
eBay buyers prefer by far posting negative reviews rather than contacting you to 
inform you why they’re not happy. But as a business, I am totally inclined to repair 
any wrongdoing or to answer any question from a dissatisfied buyer. My main 
objective is always to satisfy my clients. (N2) 
More generally, sellers expressed feelings of being “at the buyers’ mercy.” They 
described themselves as being “in a weak position towards buyers,” “in a power relationship 
that is unequal,” “with no means of appeal,” “vulnerable to whatever the buyer might 
decide,” or “powerless towards abusive buyers.” A hardware seller summed up this 
relationship: 
We, the sellers, can’t give buyers negative evaluations. So there’s a risk. The buyer 
has both hands free in the system. And the seller is constrained by it. The buyer is the 
king, and the seller is under their thumb, somehow. (N3) 
Taken together, these accounts suggest that online transactions between buyers and 
sellers were informed by pervasive power asymmetries. Online evaluations enabled buyers to 
keep their track record hidden, their identity private, and their direct e-mail confidential. In 
contrast, the track records and details of sellers were visible to all. This visibility gap was 
essential for the online market to function, facilitating comparison and competition among 
sellers. At the same time, it differentially shaped the agentic practices of buyers and sellers on 
the platform: buyers were able to avoid communication and develop hostile practices, while 
sellers had limited space for agency, which reinforced their sense of vulnerability and 
disempowerment. 
Power Asymmetries at the Governance Level 
At the governance level, power asymmetries stemmed from eBay’s capacity to impose 
sanctions and rewards through highly bureaucratic, automated practices. While sellers 
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acknowledged that eBay offered a supportive environment for trade, they also complained 
about the indifference and distance of eBay’s staff. Sellers felt disconnected from, and 
abandoned by, a platform owner who did “not care about what [they thought],” “never asked 
[them] when changes were implemented,” and “refused the possibility of a bottom-up 
dialogue.” They portrayed eBay as “annoyingly, overly self-confident.” A seller of car tuning 
parts explained that eBay failed to recognize sellers’ expertise: 
They could take advantage of our experience. They hold all the cards. We business 
sellers keep giving feedback and ideas about how to improve things on eBay. But do 
they follow-up? No, nothing! (F1) 
Two additional elements increased this feeling of indifference. First, although sellers 
saw themselves as clients, they felt that eBay relegated them to a subordinate position. They 
complained that eBay had “reached such a level of power that it [could] just dismiss their 
clients.” A seller bemoaned the “very peculiar relationship” between himself as a customer 
and eBay as a service provider that is ready and willing to “use the stick” and sanction sellers. 
Another reflected on this role ambiguity: “For eBay, we’re users who pay, but we’re not 
considered as clients. I see myself as a user, full stop. Not a client.” In trying to work out his 
status on the platform, a bookseller realized that role ambiguity formed the basis of a power 
relationship vis-à-vis eBay, which he described as one of master and servant: 
eBay’s relationships with business sellers seem very bizarre to me. I’m not sure if 
I’m a client, because I’m not treated like a client. Sometimes I wonder if I’m not 
treated like an employee. When eBay sets objectives you’re supposed to meet, it’s 
odd. You’re requested to meet targets, as if you were in a firm. But if I’m a boss and 
ask my employees to meet targets, I’ll pay them. But here, we’re not paid, we pay. 
So it’s not even like being employed. So it’s mere slavery, in fact. (C5) 
Second, sellers saw indifference in the fact that when there were problems, eBay 
systematically sided with buyers: “eBay would not take sellers into consideration, and instead 
always took the buyers’ side” and “played the trust card for the buyers to the extent that they 
completely disadvantaged and neglected the sellers.” In these circumstances, sellers felt they 
21 
 
 
were the victims of “truly uneven treatment of buyers and sellers,” illustrated by this seller of 
sporting goods: 
Until recently I considered that eBay was a partner. But recently I’ve realized it’s not 
on my side. eBay is on the buyers’ side. And it penalizes me. (T1) 
eBay was also seen as distant. Sellers explained that each time they encountered a 
problem with a buyer, staff “withdrew behind” the claim of eBay’s neutrality. One jokingly 
referred to eBay’s tendency to hide by saying, “Each time there is a hitch, the eBay people 
disappear!” eBay’s lack of involvement contradicted what sellers expected from a platform 
owner—an actor taking responsibility for transactions and helping resolve disputes between 
buyers and sellers. This generated a feeling of distrust toward the platform. One informant 
expressed his “disappointment” at “eBay retreating behind their platform status, as a neutral 
intermediary.” Another spoke of his exasperation at being told “we’re only a platform” and 
his feeling of “being taken for a complete idiot.” A seller of camera equipment explained how 
“illogical” rules of the game eroded his trust in the company: 
When I started on eBay I had a very high sense of ethics. But I quickly realized that 
eBay didn’t have any. I had two bad experiences, and each time eBay’s line was 
“we’re just an intermediary, we’re a mere platform.” When your partner takes refuge 
behind all sorts of considerations and dubious subterfuges to avoid responsibility, 
you don’t have to abide by the rules of the game the same way. So from then on, I 
too played my own illogical game. (E1) 
More broadly, sellers referred to eBay as “remote from the field” and “unaware of 
sellers’ real situation.” One expressed the view that “operating rules should be decided from 
the field, and things should be bottom-up, not top-down like now” to avoid “the imposition of 
totally inappropriate rules.” This lack of awareness was vividly captured in the “ivory tower” 
image used by a seller of industrial equipment: 
I have the feeling that they’re in their ivory tower. They decide on things without 
letting us know their arguments, and without giving us explanations or informing us 
ahead of these changes. It falls on us and it’s like this. It’s incredibly annoying, so 
much so that it blocks the development of our business on eBay. (D3) 
22 
 
 
In this setting, where indifference and distance were the norm, eBay relied on 
automated practices to govern the marketplace. One informant complained that the algorithm 
compiled the evaluations automatically and “calculated an average level of satisfaction, 
which [was] publicly posted on the website.” Another denounced the “rotten system” put in 
place by eBay by which “an algorithm gets businesses closed down” based on “mathematic 
calculations.” A third explained, “When your satisfaction level falls below 95 percent, your 
account is blocked, without any prior human analysis, because the restrictions are calculated 
by software programs.” A bookseller expressed his frustration at the automaticity of 
sanctions: 
If the evaluations didn’t count in your public profile, this wouldn’t be a problem. But 
you can be kicked off if you have one negative evaluation too many. It’s done 
through calculations that are not properly weighted. It’s a badly designed system that 
leads to conflicts and frustration. There’s no human mediation. It’s a robot. (C5) 
Automaticity did not relate only to sanctions but was also linked to interactions on the 
platform. Sellers characterized the communication with eBay’s staff as robotic. They felt 
“annoyed” at receiving “answers that [were] always irrelevant.” A seller explained that 
“answers [were] pre-formatted, automatic e-mails” and that “a proper dialogue [was] not 
possible.” A seller of motorcycles linked the “robot-like” communications to perfunctory 
reliance on rules and procedures: 
I’m not satisfied with replies to my queries, because they are sent by robots. They are 
automatic e-mails, and they’re generally off the mark. As a reply, I sometimes 
receive an excerpt from the users’ manual of rules and procedures, which doesn’t 
answer my questions. (F1) 
Sellers saw eBay’s pervasive automation as highly bureaucratic. Because of 
impersonal procedures that they did not always know or understand, they described 
themselves as “numbers who have to do what [they] have to do, come what may.” A seller 
described eBay as “very virtual, a sort of tool beyond me,” an “intangible, enormous machine 
[standing] ahead of sellers.” Another, who had his account suspended, complained about the 
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opacity of his work environment, where decisions were imposed without justification: “I 
called them, and I had someone who told me there was nothing they could do. . . . I’ve had 
my account suspended for a month now, and nobody can give me a rational explanation. . . . I 
have the feeling they want to eliminate me, but I don’t know why.” An antique dealer 
explicitly referred to eBay as a “Kafkaesque bureaucracy”: 
That’s very impersonal, and I regret it. But that’s how it is. It’s an enormous 
machine, where everything is impersonal, and we’re just a number, a pseudonym. 
And it’s very like “fill in this form, do this, do that.” Frightening sometimes! It’s a 
sort of Kafkaesque bureaucracy, terrifying stuff. This is how it is. This is the problem 
on eBay, the lack of humanization, of warm contact, of people who would come and 
tell you “Mister C., there’s a slight problem with your account.” Something like this. 
But in fact, it’s not even people who decide, it’s machines. (A3) 
eBay’s reliance on automated practices made sellers feel vulnerable. Sellers referred 
to eBay’s imposition of rules as “brutal,” “violent,” a “diktat,” and even an example of 
“disgusting fascism.” They denounced eBay’s pressure to “toe the line” and willingness to 
“kick [them] out” if they failed to comply. A seller explained, “It’s never eBay that adapts; 
it’s the seller who adapts to eBay, and this is a problem, I think, because despite everything 
they say, we’re just pawns,” A furniture seller reflected on eBay’s “own universe of rules”: 
With eBay you can’t negotiate, because they set the rules, and you’re supposed to 
know them all, to know what you can and can’t do. It’s amazing how eBay has 
created its own universe of rules, a sort of specific legal system. It’s impressive. And 
their rules overwrite existing legislation. (M4) 
eBay was able to restrict or block accounts unilaterally whenever it was dissatisfied with a 
seller’s performance. Sellers deplored eBay’s “authoritarian” or “tough” stance and its 
detrimental impact. They said that they were systematically “rapped on the knuckles” and 
“put down” by the platform owner. They complained that eBay would “never give any 
explanation” when it blocked an account, that there was “no excuse,” “no justification,” “no 
ifs and no buts.” A clothing seller likened work on eBay to labor camps in Siberia: 
Here’s how the evaluation system works: you have four criteria—communication, 
item description, delivery, and shipping costs. If you have fewer than four out of five 
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in one criterion and you fail to improve within a month, your account is closed. I call 
this “Siberia.” It’s like, you know, “You do as you’re told or we’ll beat you hard.” 
That’s nonsense. (G4) 
Sellers used other powerful metaphors during the interviews. The image of the “Sword of 
Damocles,” which we mentioned at the beginning of the paper, was evoked by four additional 
sellers to convey a sense of uncertainty and precariousness in the face of possible sanctions. 
Another recurrent metaphor was that sellers were “prisoners of eBay.” Prisons create closed 
environments in which specific rules apply, individual liberty is deprived, and monitoring is 
constant. When applied to eBay, the metaphor depicted sellers’ feelings of being caught in a 
system that expected a great deal from them while keeping them captive, because there was 
no credible alternative for online selling. Most sellers had invested time to build a reputation 
on eBay based on consistently positive evaluations. Some indicated to us that if they were 
able to quit eBay for another platform, they would have to rebuild that reputation from 
scratch, which would be overly costly. An antique seller portrayed eBay as a voracious beast 
that was difficult to satisfy and always expected more: 
When you’re in the eBay system, you can’t do anything but stay. You can’t leave the 
system. It’s not comparable to drug addiction, but it’s like feeding a beast. The more 
you feed the beast, the higher its expectations, so you need to feed it more. And 
there’s no credible competitor. It’s not like saying “Oh, I’d like to switch, I’d like to 
move to another platform.” It doesn’t exist. So after a little while, you become a 
prisoner of eBay. (A4) 
As our findings show, eBay’s governance relied on evaluations as a bureaucratic 
mechanism for the exercise of power. The platform owner’s indifference and distance 
paralleled the buyers’ anonymity and invisibility, creating a sense of isolation among sellers. 
Furthermore, eBay’s reliance on automated practices resonated with buyers’ tendency to 
adopt hostile practices and created a sense of helplessness among sellers. These parallels 
show that eBay and the buyers implicitly formed a coalition of interests that reinforced 
transactional power asymmetries while keeping sellers under strict monitoring. Under these 
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circumstances, sellers felt caught in a highly impersonal, abstract, and harsh work 
environment. Power was exercised through norms and procedures, which eBay’s algorithm 
mechanically enforced regardless of individual circumstances. This ultimately undermined 
sellers’ sense of agency on the platform. 
 
Sellers’ Working around the Algorithm 
Not all of our sellers acquiesced to their precariousness. Of the 77 we interviewed, 41 
mentioned their efforts to reclaim their sense of agency. Leaving eBay was an option noted 
by some, but all sellers acknowledged the superiority of eBay over other online platforms. 
Creating one’s own platform was seen as “super costly” as “you need to pay to be referenced 
on search engines,” and other platforms were described as “less known, not as interesting in 
terms of reputation,” “generating less traffic,” “slower to pay sellers,” and “even more 
unpredictable in terms of revenue streams” than eBay. Therefore, sellers engaged in practices 
to address and mitigate the power asymmetries on eBay—practices we refer to as “working 
around the algorithm.” 
Sellers’ Collective Practices vis-à-vis eBay 
Some sellers reported efforts to initiate collective practices in response to eBay’s behavior. 
They sought to tackle the problem of eBay’s indifference and distance by using online 
discussion forums that had originally been set up by eBay to enable business sellers to ask 
questions, help each other, and keep eBay informed of technical issues on the website. 
Subverting these intended purposes, they used the discussion forums as a tool for collective 
protest against eBay’s policy, commiserating and calling on eBay to provide explanations. 
They also took advantage of these forums to create links with fellow sellers and to “keep 
themselves informed of others’ views.” A seller of videogames portrayed the forums as 
vehicles for combating eBay’s competitive framework and promoting a collective mindset: 
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We’re divided. Sometimes we’re competitors, so it’s hard to make ourselves heard. 
We’re left in the dark. But with more and more sellers who are victims of eBay’s 
sanctions, we eventually succeeded in building this collective. The problem is that 
eBay controls the forums, so it’s like the Stasi. . . . The objective is to defend our 
rights, even our legal rights. Unfortunately, there are still too many sellers who don’t 
know about the forums. (V3) 
The reference to the Stasi suggests that forums were rigidly monitored and potential dissent 
was ruthlessly suppressed. Other sellers expressed similar suspicion when they explained that 
there was “censorship on forums” and that “if you criticize eBay, they kick you out.” Even 
though it “never happened” to them, they believed that “posts disappeared and sellers 
received warnings.” 
Some sellers attempted to tackle the problem of automated practices by creating more 
or less formal associations of sellers who were dissatisfied with the automatic sanctions. In so 
doing, they sought to address power asymmetries through collective agency. The objectives 
of these associations consisted of “collectively protecting businesses from eBay’s 
wrongdoings,” “setting the record straight,” and “reintegrating sellers who [had been] banned 
by the system.” One seller described his hope that a collective of sellers would be more likely 
than individuals “to be heard, to fight, to impose [their] views so that eBay [could] no longer 
say ‘we decided this . . . we want that . . .’.” Some associations used the media to make their 
voices heard—the president of one of them was interviewed by a French business 
newspaper—and sometimes succeeded in gaining access to the highest management levels at 
eBay France. A seller of household linens who founded an association against eBay policy 
toward the sellers told us: 
We created this association to protect ourselves from eBay’s sanctions. We want 
eBay to be intelligent and reconsider their decisions to ban business sellers. Once 
they’ve done this, we’d be happy to build more of a partnership with them. That’s 
the objective of the association, to make them understand things. (M1) 
But such collective actions were short-lived. The associations failed to mobilize, and 
none lasted for more than a few months. The forums failed to become the locus of collective 
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protest that some sellers had wanted. Most sellers, whose revenues heavily depended on eBay 
sales, expressed their lack of confidence in the forums and their fear of retaliation if a 
negative rhetoric was developed. Furthermore, because they often worked overtime to keep 
pace with customers’ orders, they saw the associations as excessively time-consuming. Under 
these circumstances, sellers found more leverage in individual solutions that targeted buyers 
directly than in collective actions that targeted the platform owner. 
Sellers’ Individual Practices vis-à-vis Buyers 
Our interviews revealed that sellers developed distinctive practices to prevent buyers from 
posting negative reviews. To tackle the problem of customer anonymity and invisibility, 
some sellers bypassed the standard modes of interaction and communicated directly with 
their buyers. In this way, they tried to create a more personal and positive contact than the 
automatic procedures allowed. They also attempted to recover their capacity to make 
decisions on a platform that had rendered them passive. One seller explained how his 
“philosophy of maximizing customer satisfaction” consisted of “always trying to regain 
control of the relationship with dissatisfied buyers through a compromise.” Some sellers 
contacted buyers who had left a negative evaluation and tried to convince them to withdraw 
it. Instead of letting buyers decide their fate anonymously, they used eBay’s messaging 
system or contacted them by telephone to “explain why the problem happened” and “find a 
common ground.” They claimed that generally “buyers were understanding” when given the 
opportunity to talk, and most agreed to withdraw their negative evaluation. A bookseller 
explained the advantage of “playing the dialogue card”: 
Most of the time, the door to dialogue remains open. It’s the simplest way to avoid 
negative evaluations: find a compromise, an arrangement. There’s always a way to 
find a solution. If you’re in trouble with a buyer, you need to play the dialogue card 
and everything that goes with it. (C2) 
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Some sellers created direct relationships with buyers by contacting them before 
evaluations were posted. Instead of relying on the automatic e-mails sent by the system 
during the transaction, they proactively used eBay’s messaging system to communicate with 
buyers, or they personalized the automatic e-mails to add specific information about the 
transaction. A seller of baby clothes described how she defused potential disputes: 
The way I deal with evaluations is, as soon as I receive a question, I answer within 
30 minutes. I tell them that I offer a guarantee; that if they’re not satisfied they have 
a refund. It’s 100 percent satisfied, or 100 percent your money back. I also explain 
the item in detail; I give as much information as possible, in all honesty. I call the 
clients as soon as I feel there’s a need to do so. Lots of communication, really. (B2) 
More radically, some sellers chose to avoid faceless and impersonal interaction by 
meeting their customers face to face—this was possible when buyers and sellers lived near 
each other. These sellers were excited about their products and saw face-to-face interactions 
as a way to exchange ideas with like-minded others. Instead of dealing electronically with 
pseudonyms, they had stimulating discussions with “very nice,” “interesting” individuals who 
sometimes “knew more than [they did] and taught [them] things.” Bypassing the algorithmic 
procedures, sellers were able to create gratifying “human contact.” For some, personal 
interaction was also a way of defusing potential conflict. A seller of motorcycle equipment 
explained that meetings involved lower risks than online interactions: 
I prefer when I meet buyers face to face, because it’s less of a hassle. They see the 
item, they can touch it, they check the quality, everything. And if they want it, they 
take it. If they don’t, they leave it. Whenever I do this, buyer satisfaction is 100 
percent (Q1) 
Although it was relatively uncommon due to the international scope of the platform, 
meeting face to face was a way of reestablishing symmetry in relationships with buyers. 
Released from the rigidity of procedural, virtual transactions, sellers felt more able to 
demonstrate their expertise and seriousness. At the same time, buyers were more likely to 
develop a positive connection with sellers when they ceased to be anonymous. 
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To tackle the problem of customers’ hostile practices, sellers devised ad hoc practices 
to protect against “bad” buyers. One way of doing this was to neutralize “suspicious profiles” 
by blocking them before they could initiate a transaction. One seller explained that he 
developed an ability to “sense suspicious behavior” just by reading buyers’ questions, while 
another explained that some items attracted “bad buyers, those who [were] a real nuisance” 
and that he selected the items he would put on sale accordingly. “Profile zero” buyers—those 
new on eBay—were considered to be particularly suspicious. Some sellers explained how 
they took additional precautions with them, such as sending messages to see how they replied 
or paying for registered mail with confirmation of receipt in order to “have proof that the item 
was received.” A jeweler told us how he profiled eBay buyers: 
I easily identify the buyers who are not serious on eBay. I simply block them. If a 
profile looks suspicious to me, long before the sale is done, I block it. Unfortunately, 
I must do this more and more often. For example, when a buyer starts the transaction 
by asking a question about the shipping costs. If he’s not entirely satisfied with the 
answer I provide, I block him. Because that’s typical of the guy who’ll be a real pain 
in the neck. (O2) 
Another practice that sellers applied was to create their own rules and enforce them. 
Instead of adhering to a scheme that “gently forced sellers to bend over backwards for the 
buyers,” they compelled buyers to abide by their rules. Doing so was a way to “padlock” 
buyers, as a seller of coin-related items explained: 
Sometimes, people assume they can have things, because in the ad it’s not clearly 
said that they can’t have them. This has progressively led me to create my own rules, 
in a sense. For example, I used to indicate shipping costs only, but somebody told me 
that it wasn’t written anywhere that insurance wasn’t included. So you need to adapt 
your ad. If you receive complaints, you have to adapt your rules to avoid losing 
money, to make sure that buyers cannot say they’re unsatisfied. I think you have to 
padlock people as much as possible, to force them to be responsible for their own 
choice. It’s a way to limit their room for maneuver. (H2) 
By constraining buyers’ behavior, sellers increased the space for their own agency. 
Some wrote extensive terms of trade, which they posted online or sent to buyers, and 
explained that “when [buyers] bought items from them on eBay, they accepted the terms of 
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trade.” One seller explained how he used his terms of trade to impose relatively long delivery 
delays compared with the norm on eBay in order to avoid complaints from buyers “who had 
gotten used to receiving everything the day after they bought it.” Another told us that he had 
set strict payment due dates and would send the items after the payment was received to 
avoid the risk of unpaid purchases. 
A related practice was to systematically open disputes against abusive buyers, which 
some sellers did if payment was not made by the deadline. Because buyers involved in 
multiple non-payment disputes could be suspended, this was a way for sellers to sanction 
those who were prone to use hostile practices. A seller of coins explained his routine way of 
coping with problem buyers: 
It’s very simple. If after 10 days I’ve not heard from the seller, I open a dispute 
directly. After 17 days, I terminate the transaction. The sale is cancelled, and eBay 
refunds my fees. When a buyer gets caught in several disputes, eBay eventually 
kicks him out (S2) 
Although the platform was purposely designed to minimize sellers’ agency, the moves 
described above were ways to redress asymmetries by exploiting small gaps in the system. In 
a setting that encouraged anonymity, sellers forced buyers to become visible. By contacting 
buyers directly, they positioned themselves between eBay and the buyers and regained the 
initiative. Similarly, sellers imposed stricter rules of engagement with buyers by customizing 
and making explicit their terms of trade. Algorithmic features, such as the formal dispute 
procedure or blocking tools, could be used to respond to the threat of negative evaluations. 
By working around the algorithm, sellers created a space within which their own rules 
applied and thereby made their relationships with buyers less asymmetrical. Instead of 
accommodating algorithmic procedures, they tried to influence buyers’ behavior in a 
preferred direction. 
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Discussion 
In this paper, we asked what sellers’ experience of being evaluated reveals about power 
asymmetries in online work settings and how those subjected to online evaluations cope with 
algorithm-mediated forms of power. We addressed these questions in the context of a group 
of high-performing sellers having to deal with customer reviews on the eBay platform. 
Sellers revealed a high degree of sensitivity to negative reviews, which triggered feelings of 
anxiety and vulnerability. Our findings highlight three sets of mechanisms through which 
power operates in online work settings. First, online customer evaluations generate a new 
form of employee monitoring that is exercised through the construction of gaps of visibility 
between sellers and buyers and through an implicit coalition between buyers and the platform 
owner, who join together in the evaluation procedures. Second, algorithms constitute and 
reproduce power asymmetries by objectifying and mediating relations among the different 
categories of actors, thereby constraining human agency. Third, online customer evaluations 
prompt sellers to exploit their practical knowledge of the algorithm to increase their sense of 
agency. These findings have theoretical implications. 
Online Customer Evaluations and Platform Monitoring 
Our study provides a novel understanding of employee monitoring in online settings. In 
traditional settings, employee monitoring takes place in the context of supervisor–subordinate 
relationships, whereby a supervisor collects information about an employee’s performance 
and behavior through direct observation, informal data gathering, and work sampling 
(Komaki, 1986; Niehoff and Moorman, 1993; Long, Bendersky, and Morrill, 2011). In 
contrast, in online settings monitoring results from ongoing interactions among a triad of 
actors: buyers post online reviews, which are interpreted by the platform’s algorithm and 
provide visible feedback to both the seller and the wider market. These triadic interactions 
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reproduce power asymmetries through two complementary mechanisms: the 
disaggregation/aggregation of individual agency and the formation of a coalition of interests 
between a mass of invisible buyers and a distant platform owner. 
The gap of visibility between buyers and sellers generates power asymmetries by 
promoting dynamics of disaggregation/aggregation. On eBay, sellers’ perfect visibility 
facilitates ongoing comparison through ranking and classification. Singled out on the 
platform by their profile and average score, they are placed in a highly competitive 
environment in which they need to perform better than others to maintain their reputation and 
survive. Under these circumstances, sellers are isolated. In contrast, buyers, who can read 
each other’s evaluations, operate in a virtual network of actors who share their opinions and 
recommendations online. Moreover, eBay’s algorithm consolidates the myriad evaluations 
into an average score, which represents the wisdom of the crowd and aggregates buyers into a 
unified entity. The perception of being confronted with a collective rather than individuals 
reinforces sellers’ sense of isolation. The mechanism of disaggregation/aggregation therefore 
enables power asymmetries by generating categories of actors with differential agency and by 
separating those who monitor from those who are subjected to monitoring. 
The second mechanism characterizing platform monitoring is the creation of a 
coalition of interests between buyers and the platform owner. By posting online reviews, 
buyers feed the platform owner with information on sellers’ performance. The algorithm 
collects, interprets, and uses reviews to automatically sanction sellers who fail to reach a pre-
established threshold. The criteria by which online feedback is quantified and used for the 
purpose of monitoring are designed and controlled by the platform owner. Consequently, the 
algorithm not only aggregates buyers as a category but also connects this category with the 
platform owner. The power asymmetries at governance and transactional levels are mutually 
reinforcing, thus generating a multiplier effect on sellers’ feelings of disempowerment. In the 
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sellers’ eyes, buyers’ anonymity is amplified by the platform owner’s indifference and 
distance. In addition, buyers’ hostile practices are made more oppressive by eBay’s blunt 
procedural practices. In this way, online evaluations produce a “coalition of the invisibles” 
(buyers and platform owner) and an “isolation of the visibles” (sellers). As for the mechanism 
of disaggregation/aggregation, the actors’ differential ability to form a coalition on the 
platform represents a further manifestation of power asymmetries. 
Our findings extend our understanding of modern forms of employee monitoring. By 
integrating social actors at transactional and governance levels, online platforms blend two 
forms of monitoring: network and panoptic. Because it relies on mechanisms of 
(dis)aggregation, platform monitoring has commonalities with network monitoring. In 
networks, evaluations take place through subtle readings of signals that are difficult to verify, 
such as a regular customer who leaves for a competitor or the occasional aggressive clients 
who raise their voices (Ouchi, 1977, 1980). Word of mouth, or interactions and interpersonal 
communication among users and potential users of a product, can build and destroy 
reputations (Mahajan, Muller, and Kerin, 1984). Accordingly, online feedback has been 
described as “an ancient concept in a modern setting”: a modern way to elicit good conduct 
through word-of-mouth networks (Dellarocas, 2003: 1409). In online settings, monitoring 
relies on the subjective and potentially contradictory judgments of a myriad of customers, 
whom the algorithm has turned into evaluators. 
Simultaneously, coalitions of interests and reliance on automatic procedures allow the 
platform owner to exert power over a large population of individuals at the lowest possible 
cost and by imposing the rationalism of norms, classifications, and rankings, which are key 
characteristics of panopticon monitoring. Like the panopticon, online evaluations constitute 
an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the asymmetries in which individuals 
are caught up (Foucault, 1977). By creating gaps of visibility and isolating those who are 
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being supervised, it is possible to intervene at any moment against, and to exert constant 
pressure on, individuals. Therefore, online platform monitoring represents a “subtle form of 
coercion”: a routinized subservience that produces docile subjects (Elmer, 2012: 25). 
Online platform monitoring is thus a form of post-panopticism whereby “the people 
operating the levers of power on which the fate of the less volatile partners in the relationship 
depends can at any moment escape beyond reach—into sheer inaccessibility” (Bauman, 
2012: 11). Post-panoptic power, characterized by the coexistence of network and panoptic 
monitoring, creates ambiguity for those who are subjected to it, generating anxiety. In 
addition to being part of a large network of users with whom they transact freely, sellers are 
situated in a formal, hierarchical power structure. They expect to receive feedback from a 
community of buyers and adjust their behaviors autonomously. Instead, feedback is 
processed by an algorithm and serves as the basis for automatic sanction procedures. They 
run their online business independently, yet they are excluded from the chain of agency that 
links evaluations with sanctions. The outcome is a system that is on the borderline between 
an enabling and a coercive bureaucracy (Adler and Borys, 1996; Hodson et al., 2013), 
applying apparently fair rules of exchange while simultaneously creating asymmetries of 
power and a Kafkaesque work environment in which decisions seem to be arbitrary because 
they are never explained. 
Algorithms and the Sociomateriality of Power 
Our second contribution relates to the sociomateriality of power in the context of online 
platforms. Organizational literature has shown how information technology “has become 
inextricably intertwined with social relations to weave the fabric of organization” (Zammuto 
et al., 2007: 752). Algorithms are examples of the sociomaterial entanglement of humans and 
technology underpinning everyday work practices (Orlikowski, 2000; Orlikowski and Scott, 
2015). Entanglement, in this case, means first that technologies produce material 
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performances, which are accomplished within the scope of human purposes (Pickering, 
1993), and second that human agency is contingent on available technologies and is exercised 
in practice through material means (Leonardi and Barley, 2010; Beane and Orlikowski, 
2015). Our study extends sociomaterial understandings of contemporary work by showing 
how algorithms are implicated in the constitution and reproduction of power asymmetries and 
how algorithmic performances affect agency at work. In this way, we highlight the dark side 
of the entanglement of humans and algorithms. 
First, algorithms simultaneously constitute and reproduce power asymmetries on 
online platforms. The algorithm is a “non-human actant”: an object endowed with the ability 
to accomplish ad hoc performances (Latour, 1990; Lanzara and Patriotta, 2007). Algorithmic 
performances are based on a chain of delegations whereby the designer (platform owner) 
codifies programs of action that are inscribed into the algorithm and that drive transactions 
among buyers, sellers, and the platform owner. Programs of action empower some groups of 
actors by granting them more rights (buyers can evaluate sellers), disempower some others by 
granting them fewer rights (sellers cannot reciprocate with negative evaluations), and set 
procedures that regulate interactions on the platform (by imposing evaluation criteria on 
buyers or downgrading sellers with low scores). When put into practice, the algorithm runs 
the set of instructions specified in the code. By so doing, it affects the agentic moves of the 
actors involved. Examples include buyers’ hostile practices, which are enabled by the 
anonymity and invisibility conferred by the algorithm, or eBay’s automated practices, which 
contribute to a dehumanized work environment in which communication with the platform 
owner is absent. Under these circumstances, the algorithm has structuring properties in that it 
molds asymmetric relationships on the platform. Through repeated online interactions, social 
actors perform the programs of action while reproducing power asymmetries on an ongoing 
basis. 
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Second, algorithms objectify and script social relations on the platform, which 
reduces the space for agency at work. Objectification occurs because algorithms consolidate 
multiple subjective opinions into an authoritative computation. In this work environment, the 
focus is on percentages of positive ratings, which are recalculated on an ongoing basis as 
buyers feed the system with new online reviews. Sellers are anxious that one evaluation too 
many might automatically trigger a status downgrade. The frustration and anxiety sellers 
experience are partly due to a feeling of being surrounded by things rather than people and 
hence being unable to communicate and justify their actions. 
Algorithms also script interactions. In traditional, non-algorithmic settings, sellers use 
rhetoric, persuasiveness, or dissimulation to seek support from the market regulator or obtain 
a desired outcome from their customers (Geertz, 1978; Sherry, 1990). In algorithmic settings, 
their actions are channeled by predefined categories and automated procedures. At a 
transactional level, sellers have to follow a script that mechanically leads up to customers’ 
evaluations and makes them feel at buyers’ mercy. At a governance level, sellers’ 
solicitations or complaints are replied to in automated, preformatted e-mails. In this work 
environment, sellers’ space for agency is significantly diminished. 
The dark side of the algorithm–human entanglement resides in these mechanisms, 
which can lead to alienation at work. The entanglement of humans and technology can be 
confrontational, as technology may resist human agency, while humans have to accommodate 
non-human agency in their activities (Pickering, 1993). But algorithms do more than resist 
human agency: they constrain it. Resistance and constraint have different qualities. While 
resistance is diachronic, “as a block arising in practice to this or that passage of goal-oriented 
practice,” constraint is synchronic, “always there, just like the walls of the prison” (Pickering, 
1993: 583–584). The rigid instructions encoded in an algorithm are continuously present and 
hence can feel fixed and intractable. The prison metaphor used by some of our informants 
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conveys sellers’ feeling of being trapped and deprived of their agency: just like the walls of a 
prison, algorithmic metrics are the material manifestation of agential constraints, and because 
of algorithmic intermediation, sellers are less able to exercise their skills as sellers than they 
would be in traditional settings. 
We thus propose a sociomateriality of power that conceptualizes the impact of 
“working for an algorithm.” Power asymmetries are embodied in material artifacts—
algorithms—that shape social relations on online platforms and delimit the scope of action. 
Beyond being neutral machines, algorithms are “technologies of power” (Foucault, 1977; 
Kemmis, 1993). They materialize the needs, wants, and desires of the platform owner; they 
coordinate the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data; and they enable, as well as 
constrain, multiple forms of agency on the online platform. 
Practices for Increasing Agency 
Our third contribution relates to practices for increasing agency in the context of online 
evaluations. Although individuals who work for online marketplaces can theoretically leave 
and start anew somewhere else, platforms are generally difficult to escape from because of 
the lack of alternatives and the problems associated with rebuilding a reputation from scratch 
on another platform. Most individuals therefore remain within the system and develop their 
own practices for relieving their anxiety. Our findings enhance our understanding of practice 
in relation to the exercise of power and the way it is embedded in material configurations 
(Orlikowski, 2000; Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, and von Savigny, 2001). They suggest that online 
workers’ practices are rooted in each individual’s experiential knowledge of the algorithm. 
First, sellers’ practices inform our understanding of how individuals cope with new 
forms of monitoring. Research on power in traditional work settings has emphasized coping 
mechanisms that rely on either discipline or deviation from the norms. In the first instance, 
employees, realizing the prospect of being watched at all times, behave as they should for 
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fear of hierarchical sanctions (Foucault, 1977; Elmer, 2012). In the second instance, workers 
deliberately develop tactics to elude supervision (Vallas, 2006; Anteby and Chan, 2018) or 
exploit technological malfunctions to occupy areas of uncertainty (Crozier and Friedberg, 
1980). Our findings suggest that, in the context of online platforms, discipline and deviation 
from the norms acquire different meanings than those generally implied. Discipline is 
primarily associated with the prospect of market sanctions: slipping down the rankings, 
losing one’s reputation, and ultimately missing trades. Sellers comply with eBay’s 
performance targets because algorithmic procedures systematically link individual 
monitoring with market functioning. Similarly, deviation from the norms neither eludes 
supervision nor exploits technological failures. Rather, sellers take advantage of algorithmic 
features, such as formal disputes, the blocking function, or the possibility of inserting one’s 
own rules of trade on the platform, to gain the upper hand over buyers. We have 
characterized these efforts as “working around the algorithm,” the aim of which is to increase 
individual autonomy and redress power asymmetries. 
Second, our findings advance our understanding of collective agency in the digital 
workplace. It is generally acknowledged that work practices are developed and sustained 
through collective engagement (Barnes, 2001; Hodson, 2001): collective agency derives from 
participation in communities of practice (Brown and Duguid, 1991; Lave and Wenger, 1991), 
which provide the context for a virtuous circle of learning as individuals share knowledge 
related to the practice while simultaneously developing a community-related social identity. 
In turn, this increases mutual trust and fosters further engagement in the community 
(Melucci, 1995; Brown and Duguid, 2001; Thompson, 2005). The notion of communities of 
practice implies that individuals rely on the collective to maintain expectations about how 
they and others will act. 
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In contrast, our findings suggest that although sellers on an online platform potentially 
form a virtual community of practice, they are not able to exert collective agency. The 
ongoing flow of reviews affects sellers’ ranking and visibility. This creates a highly 
competitive work environment in which sellers are encouraged to focus on their individual 
performance rather than on sharing good practices or engaging in collective actions through 
associations or unions. Besides, the delegation of agency to a ubiquitous algorithm induces 
fear that criticisms of the platform owner will be sanctioned. Caught in the crossfire of 
buyers’ hostile practices and algorithmic monitoring, online workers are therefore unlikely to 
engage in collective resistance. Instead, they rely on their own initiative to exert some 
influence over individual customers. 
A broader theoretical consideration concerns the differential status of sellers, 
customers, and platform owner as collective actors. Namely, while both eBay and the buyers 
operate as unitary actors, thanks to the algorithm, sellers’ agency is fragmented and 
dispersed. At the transactional level, buyers are aggregated as a crowd whose individual 
actions produce collective evaluations, while sellers are constructed as isolated individuals. 
At the governance level, eBay embodies the unity of the platform, while sellers experience 
ambiguity of status, unsure of whether they qualify as clients, employees, or victims. These 
structural conditions ultimately affect sellers’ capacity for collective agency; they provide a 
way of partitioning the triad, a sort of “divide and rule” mechanism designed by the platform 
owner. 
Third, our findings extend practice-based studies of online work by revealing how 
practical knowledge of the algorithm may constitute an instrument of power. Sellers’ 
unconventional practices, such as bypassing the algorithm at a certain stage of the transaction 
or using certain algorithmic features to influence buyers’ behavior, are embedded in 
technology. Using the platform day in and day out, sellers develop deep knowledge of it. In 
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contrast, one can assume that buyers, who use the system more sporadically, do not develop a 
comparable level of familiarity. This asymmetry of knowledge does not relate to the formal, 
abstract comprehension of the algorithmic instructions, which are generally kept secret by its 
designers (Orlikowski and Scott, 2015), but to a practical understanding of algorithmic tools. 
Through “practicing” the algorithm, sellers may be able to figure out the information and 
interactions it includes and excludes. They can then appropriate these excluded areas with the 
purpose of increasing their agency. For example, eBay’s policy of indifference and non-
interference induces sellers to sort it out by themselves and hence gives them an opportunity 
to bypass the impersonal algorithm and solve problems directly with buyers. Similarly, 
eBay’s reliance on rigid, automatic procedures allows sellers to use some of these procedures 
against “bad” buyers. 
Thus algorithms restrain sellers’ agency while at the same time giving them the 
opportunity to learn from their use—a contrast documented by other scholars. In their study 
of TripAdvisor, Orlikowski and Scott (2014: 881) talked about how hoteliers “reported a 
sense of increased vulnerability and loss of control as a result of their new online visibility” 
through reviews, while simultaneously developing practices in response to such pressure. A 
core aspect of hoteliers’ practices is managing the reviews, for example by manipulating 
guests’ expectations, incorporating online reviews into the ongoing management of the hotel, 
and responding to bad reviews. Our study suggests that, in addition to managing reviews, 
online workers exploit their practical understanding of the algorithm to emancipate 
themselves from the entanglement of humans and technology underpinning their work. In 
other words, they develop practices around the algorithm to cope with working for an 
algorithm. 
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Implications and Limitations 
Our findings can foster naturalistic generalization, as parallels may be drawn between the 
description of a case and one’s own experience in similar contexts (Stake, 1995). The eBay 
case highlights workers’ experience in contexts in which everything is metrified and 
subjected to evaluation. Metrification is encouraged by the introduction of the ideology of 
market transparency in the workplace (Power, 1999; Espeland and Sauder, 2007; Orlikowski 
and Scott, 2015). What was previously the remit of word of mouth and subjective judgment is 
now quantified, categorized, and compiled to create overall metrics, generating more 
transparency and simultaneously giving rise to more intrusive forms of monitoring. More and 
more human activities might become subject to metrification, classification, comparison, and 
market competition. The findings of this study help us understand the implications of this 
macro-level tendency for individuals’ sense of agency at work. 
Our findings can be also analytically generalized by moving beyond the empirical 
phenomenon to consider the conceptual implications of the case study (Yin, 2018). With the 
rise of online platforms, evaluation has achieved the status of a public good. By 
systematically requesting feedback, online algorithms turn social actors such as users, 
patients, visitors, and students into customers. Through magnifying individual experience 
beyond what people would normally expect, online evaluations redefine power asymmetries 
in society between those who can evaluate (the customers) and those who are evaluated. Our 
insights stress the urgent need to revisit the way we conceptualize power in increasingly 
customer-based societies by incorporating considerations on the hybrid nature of monitoring 
and governance: at the intersection of markets and bureaucracies, and through entanglement 
of social and material components. This research provides a step in this direction. 
One limitation of our research relates to the specificities of the case itself, which is a 
“pure” case of online interactions. Other settings comprise a more mixed set of online–offline 
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interactions. For example, platforms such as RateMyProfessor, Uber, and TripAdvisor rely 
on online evaluations of offline transactions such as a university course, a taxi journey, or a 
night in a hotel. As we have shown, when there is an opportunity for the provider and the 
customer to meet outside of the algorithm, it becomes possible for the provider to influence 
the buyer’s perception. Moreover, the prospect of being evaluated online may change the way 
transactions are conducted offline (Scott and Orlikowski, 2012). Our point is that online 
platform monitoring and the sociomateriality of power may play out differently when actors 
move in and out of the algorithm. 
Another limitation concerns the relatively decontextualized nature of our study, which 
does not differentiate among sellers’ backgrounds, gender, nationality, ethnicity, age, or 
tenure on eBay. Future studies might contextualize further to identify and explain different 
ways of coping with online customer reviews. In relation to power asymmetries, the reliance 
on online evaluations generates new cognitive and emotional challenges for those working in 
algorithm-mediated environments. It is therefore urgent to investigate what makes online 
workers more resilient and able to cope with these challenges. 
Conclusion 
Online platforms powered by algorithms and populated by crowds of users who feed personal 
opinions into the system have become a pervasive phenomenon in contemporary 
organizations. As a consequence, producers of goods and services can be subjected, with or 
without their consent, to evaluations by customers, managers, and other stakeholders. The 
negative evaluation that even high performers occasionally receive reveals the normally 
concealed power structure within which individuals carry out their daily work. The intrusion 
of power asymmetries in online settings, generally associated with independence and 
autonomy, may provoke strong negative feelings of vulnerability and attempts to escape or 
game the algorithm. Thus online work settings seem to incarnate a post-panoptic world in 
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which traditional dyadic distinctions between supervisors and supervisees, clients and 
employees, and leaders and followers become blurred. In this context, as Bauman (2012: 11) 
wrote, the prime technique of power is “escape, slippage, elision and avoidance, the effective 
rejection of any territorial confinement with its cumbersome corollaries of order-building, 
order-maintenance and the responsibility for the consequences of it all as well as of the 
necessity to bear their costs.” This study contributes to a better understanding of power 
asymmetries in online work settings—a topic that deserves further research. 
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Table 1. Number of Sellers Interviewed per Category of Items 
eBay product categories 
Code in 
text Number of sellers 
Art and antiques A 4 
Baby items B 2 
Books, comics and magazines C 7 
Business, office and industrial D 5 
Cameras and photography E 2 
Cars and vehicles F 4 
Clothes, shoes and accessories G 4 
Coins H 5 
Collectables I 3 
Computers J 2 
DVDs, films, TV K 2 
Health and beauty L 3 
Furniture M 4 
Home, garden and DIY N 5 
Jewelry and watches O 4 
Mobile phones and communication P 2 
Motorcycles and parts Q 2 
Music and musical instruments R 4 
Postcards and stamps S 3 
Sporting goods and holidays T 3 
Toys and games U 3 
Videogames and consoles V 4 
Total all categories   77 
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Figure 1. Data coding structure. 
53 
 
 
 
